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FEDERAL RESPONSE TO INSURANCE
COVERAGE ISSUES CREATED BY 9/11
WAYNE A. CIMONS*
My presentation is on TRIA, the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act
["the Act"]. 1 It's helpful to address why the Act was needed in the
first place. After the attacks of September 11th, the bottom line
was that the insurance industry, human life, and all of us had
suffered a terrible loss. What we faced in the insurance industry
was a situation whereby subsequent attacks could not be
withstood without impairing the capital or even the solvency of a
number of insurance companies. This was primarily because of
two reasons. First, reinsurers who were not necessarily
regulated by the states had the option of getting out of the
insurance business.2 Reinsurers are basically the insurers for
insurers.3 After the terrorism attacks, reinsurers were paying a
lot of the bill; now they were getting out. Second, many state
laws required insurers to provide coverage with no exclusions. 4
Thus, while the easiest answer for an insurer to escape terrorism
loss was to say they would not cover it as part of a policy, that
was not necessarily an option. Workers' compensation is one of
the biggest examples. If you had twenty thousand workers who
lost their lives due to a terrorist attack, this would have to be
paid for by an insurance company. However, I am not sure how
* These remarks are an actual transcript of the author's comments at the St. John's
Journal of Legal Commentary Symposium on Mar. 14, 2003.
1 Terrorism Risk Insurance Act, Pub. L. No. 107-297, 116 Stat. 2322 (2002) (codified
in 15 U.S.C. § 6701 (2003), 28 U.S.C. § 1606 (2003)) (setting forth United States'
Terrorism Insurance Program in response to Sept. 11th attacks).
2 See generally Insuring the Insurers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2001, at 12 (noting insurers
who had covered terrorist attacks prior to Sept. 11th attacks were hinting at not renewing
existing polices in response to losses suffered).
3 See Charles F. Corcoran, III, Reinsurance Litigation: A Primer, 16 W. NEW. ENG. L.
REV. 41, 41 (1994) (defining reinsurers as "insurance company's insurer[s]").
4 See Diane Levick, State Insists on Terror Coverage; Regulators Aren't Allowing
Insurers to Exclude It, HARTFORD COURANT, Dec. 15, 2001, at El (noting that after Sept.
1 1th attacks insurance regulators in Connecticut forbid insurers from excluding terrorism
coverage in commercial and personal insurance policies).
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many companies in the United States have the capacity to handle
those losses. So you had a situation where the insurance
industry faced the real potential of substantial losses from
terrorism with no reinsurance available to mitigate the risks.
Whether or not insurers should have considered this before is
another issue, but you had a situation with the potential for real
losses, which threatened the solvency of the industry. 5 In the
near term you could have had insolvency problems; in the longer
term you would have had people getting out of the business
altogether. Insurance for terrorism losses would not be available,
which is the situation that Congress faced when it looked at the
Terrorism Risk Insurance Act.
We like to think that Congress looks at all these issues and
then sits down and sees what is best for the country. To a large
extent it does that, but for the most part Congress and legislators
tend to approach issues in the context of interest groups. 6 Who is
coming to them? Who are the winners? Who are the losers? How
are these winners and losers reflected within my own
constituency? After September 11 th, Congress faced a range of
competing interests or interest groups. First were the insurers
who, for the reasons already explained, wanted to have some
protection against insolvency and complete ruin in the event of
another terrorist event. You also had policyholders who want to
have coverage for losses that they were at risk for and they want
to have coverage at the lowest cost possible-even free. You also
had state regulators. Insurance is traditionally regulated at the
state level. 7 There are no federal insurance companies, except for
a handful of exceptions. Consequently, state regulators had an
interest in preserving the state role in the regulation of
insurance. Next, there were "consumer" groups, who I'll
essentially characterize as not being fans of business and who
think that insurance companies are rich, fat, happy, and out to
5 See Dee DePass, Insurance Execs Predict Strong 2003, STAR TRIBUNE (Minn., MN),
Oct. 5, 2002, at 2D (highlighting cost of Sept. 11th attacks as close to $40 billion in
insurance claims).
6 See generally Larry J. Pittman, The Federal Arbitration Act: The Supreme Courts
Erroneous Statutory Interpretation State Decisis and a Proposal for Change, 53 ALA. L.
REV. 789, 806 (2002) (positing feasibility of Congress putting forth laws which benefit
interest groups more than public).
7 See Tommy G. Thompson, A Governor's Perspective on the Trade, Bus. AMERICA,
May 6, 1991, at 13 (noting service industries, such as insurance and legal industries, are
regulated at the state level).
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rip consumers off. They think any insurance that they provide,
similar to policyholders, should be free if possible.
You had taxpayer groups, in light of September 11th and the
so-called bail-out of the airline industry,8 saying that there
should be no federal money at all going to bail out insurance
companies. They claimed this is something that should be left to
private markets and that there was no role for the federal
government at all.9 Economic policymakers were also involved.
These are the people in the laboratory trying to determine what
is best for the country. They were asking, "What is the real
economic impact of this terrorist event in insurance markets on
the country, and how do we approach this? Which is the best
answer to get this country moving forward and promote economic
growth?"
Finally, you had the plaintiffs' attorneys, who essentially
wanted to preserve the right to profit by suing anyone, anywhere,
anytime and for anything.
This led to competing proposals. The first one, which was sort
of touched upon by another panelist, was Pool-Re. 10 This was
something put together by the insurance industry where the
insurers would create a a federally-chartered insurance entity. 11
Basically, numerous insurers would get together and form a
federal insurance company, pool their assets, and have a
government backstop for losses upon a certain amount.12
Unfortunately, this proved to be extremely complicated. As with
all legislation- -and anything you deal with in the law, the devil
is always in the details, and this involved a lot of details.
8 See Deirdre Shesgreen & Cynthia Wilson, Congressional Leaders Work on Bailout
Plan for Airlines, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Sept. 15, 2001, at 11 (discussing multi-billion
dollar bailout package for airline industry proposed by House leaders in response to
shutdown of air travel because of Sept. 1 1th attacks).
9 See, e.g., David Keating, Insuring Against Catastrophe, WASH. POST, Nov. 28, 2001,
at A34 (arguing proposals for federal terror insurance paying insurance company claims
would be unreasonable in light of premiums).
10 See Greg Farrell, Insurers Offer Plan for Terror Coverage, USA TODAY, Oct.11,
2001, at 3B (discussing insurance companies' proposal for creation of reinsurance pool in
response to Sept. 1 1th attacks).
11 See id. (explaining how reinsurance proposal involved federal government paying
insurance claims for 2002 calendar year of terrorism damage to allow new industry fund
to build up enough money to pay for terrorism damage on its own afterwards).
12 See id. (quoting Maurice Greenberg, chairman of American International Group,
saying "there's going to be a need for a reinsurer of last resort," in reference to federal
government's proposed relationship with insurance industry).
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The House of Representatives was the first to jump on the
bandwagon by saying that there was a need for federal
legislation, and they came up with a plan that was essentially a
federal loan facility. 13 If there were terrorist losses, the federal
government would loan money to the insurance industry to pay
off the losses and the insurance industry would pay back these
loans. 14 Needless to say, that was not something that we favored.
The White House plan came out after the House plan and it
was more conceptual. In fact, it ultimately was the foundation
for the final plan. They basically said that there was a serious
issue on the economic policy grounds. There were negative
impacts on the economy and uncertainty in the aftermath of 9/11.
What the government should do is provide a federal cost share
system whereby the federal government would pay all losses
above a certain amount and for a temporary amount of time. 15 In
many respects I think the White House may have thought that if
there were losses that were uninsured, the federal government
would have been paying the bill anyway. What they tried to do is
establish a quasi-private-public transitional system until the
marketplace could figure out or try to get its arms around
terrorism risk and price the product in the future.
This led to a Senate compromise, which was the flesh and
bones of the White House plan. What was interesting about the
Senate compromise was that it contained a provision that held
up passage for over a year: no punitive damages. 16 This was
agreed to by the responsible Democratic Senators, Christopher
Dodd and Paul Sarbanes, and Phil Gramm of Texas on the
Republican side. 17 This was the ultimate agreement and they felt
this way was the best way to go forward. When this plan was
brought to the Senate Democratic leadership, however, Senate
13 See Terrorism Insurance, DENVER POST, Dec. 4, 2001, at B-06 (explaining House
plan required federal government to offer low-interest loans to insurers if damages from
terrorist acts exceeded one billion dollars).
14 See id. (noting House plan allowed federal government to recover loaned money by
imposing surcharges on commercial policyholders where losses exceeded $20 billion
dollars).
15 See generally Terrorism Risk Insurance Act § 103 (providing for United States
federal government to temporarily provide compensation for certain losses).
16 See Terrorism Insurance Act, S. 1744, 107th Cong. (2001) (excluding provision for
punitive damages).
17 See Senate Vote No. 153, 107th Cong. (2003) (showing that Senators Dodd,
Sarbanes, and Gramm all voted in favor of enacting bill without provision for punitive
damages).
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Democratic leader Tom Daschle heard from the trial lawyers and
they said, "No punitive damages, no bill." We basically went
another year before having a final bill, until the White House
came off its insistence on barring punitive damages in all
terrorism cases .18
Another proposal, the Hollings bill, 19 did not really get a lot of
attention. It mostly reflected the interests of consumer groups.20
This proposal would have entailed another type of federal loan
facility paid off by surcharges on the insurance industry.21 But
what the bill did, and brought into play at a more formal level,
was giving the Department of Commerce and the federal
government the authority to review insurance rates. 22 That could
have been an invitation for federal rate regulation for terrorism
insurance. This was important because it solidified the notion
that if we were going to enact a federal backstop, there were a
number of people in Congress that wanted to make sure that the
rates were not open-ended. 2 3
Ultimately in November 2002, President Bush signed the
law.24 It was largely based upon the Senate compromise. 25 There
were some features to address concerns of taxpayer groups that
allowed the federal government to recoup any federal assistance
paid, but it was not mandatory. 26
18 See Terrorism Risk Insurance Legislation: Summary of Key Provisions, (2002), at
http://www.ncci.com/media/pdf/key _provisions/pdf. (last visited Oct. 21, 2003) (describing
agreement between President and Senate Democrats regarding language concerning
punitive damages).
19 S. 1743, 107th Cong. (2001) (offering alternative bill addressing terrorism risk
insurance sponsored by Senator Earnest F. Hollings).
20 See id. (showing language favorable to consumer groups).
21 See id. (indicating insurance industry would have absorbed weight of costs).
22 See id. (granting federal government greater control of cost of terrorism insurance
to consumers).
23 See id. (demonstrating introduction of Hollings bill revealed some Congressional
support for federal government's ability to cap terrorism insurance rates).
24 See President Bush Signs Terrorism Insurance Bill, (2002), at http://www.georgew
bush.com/News/read.aspx?ID=1668 (last visited Oct. 21, 2003) (indicating that President
Bush signed Terrorism Risk Insurance bill on November 26, 2002).
25 See generally Negotiators Finish Terrorism Insurance Deal, PITT. TRIB. REVIEW,
Oct. 18, 2002, available at http://livesite.pittsburghlive.com/x/tribune-review/terrorism/
archive/s 97545.html (stating "agreement was on a three-year, $100 billion package that
would have the government cover 90 percent of all terror losses after insurance companies
pay an initial amount of $10 billion").
26 Terrorism Risk Insurance Act Terrorism Risk Insurance Act § 101(7), Pub. L. No.
107-297, 116 Stat. 2322 (2002) (granting option to taxpayers of allowing federal
government to recover assistance paid).
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The Act creates a three-year federal cost-sharing program for
losses arising from acts of terrorism. 27 It is a shared program
between private insurance and the federal government. 28 TRIA
covers most commercial property and casualty lines, and one of
the key features is that all commercial property and casualty
insurers covered by law are required to offer coverage for
terrorism insurance on the same terms and conditions as other
coverages. 29 Just to simplify, if you are offering a million dollars
worth of coverage with a two hundred thousand dollar deductible
for destruction of a building by any cause, you have to offer that
same type of coverage for an act of terrorism.
The Act also contained some key definitions. What is "an act of
terrorism?" It is defined in the Act as, "an act that is violent or
dangerous to human life, property or infrastructure that occurs
in the United States, including its territories. '30 It also extends
to air carriers, U.S. vessels and U.S. missions.31 The act has to be
committed on behalf of a foreign interest as certified by the
Secretary of the Treasury in concurrence with the Attorney
General, 32 and excludes acts in the course of a declared war with
the exception of workers compensation. 33  The workers
compensation coverage for a declared war is really a technical fix
because insurers cannot exclude losses for workers compensation
resulting from acts of war. One interesting part is that acts "on
behalf of a foreign interest"34 excludes domestic terrorism. 35 As
Congress started to look at this a bit more, they realized that this
did not necessarily make sense. When you look at Timothy
McVeigh and you try to define religious terrorism, which can
have a domestic origin, why should such acts be excluded? In
27 See id. § 101(b), § 108(a) (forming cost sharing program between insurance
industry and federal government for losses arising from acts of terrorism).
28 See id. § 101(6) (stating that creation of a federal program is important to stabilize
economy while plan for terrorism risk insurance is formulated).
29 See id. § 103(c) (requiring all insurance entities to provide adequate coverage).
30 Id. § 102(1)(A).
31 See id. § 102(1)(A)(iii)(1) (mandating which acts of terrorism are covered).
32 See id. § 102(1)(A) (codified at 15 U.S.C. 248, 1610, 6701) (identifying who may
define an "act of terrorism").
33 See id. § 102(1)(B)(i) (limiting the definition of an "act of terrorism").
34 See id. § 102(1)(A)(iv) (defining acts of terrorism as acts committed "on behalf of a
foreign person or foreign interest" against the United States "to coerce the civilian
population of the United States or to influence the policy or affect the conduct of the
United States Government by coercion").
35 See id. § 102(1) (excluding domestic acts of terrorism in definition of "act[s] of
terrorism").
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general I think a lot of people in Congress wanted to put
domestic coverage in. However, there was an earlier wrinkle on
a bankruptcy bill, which was held up because of the manner in
which abortion protesters were characterized. 36 They were
viewed by pro-abortion individuals as perhaps engaging in acts of
violence and terrorist acts. 37 Abortion opponents thought that if
they extended the terrorism bill to domestic acts of terrorism
then it could somehow sweep in these abortion protesters. 38 This
caused so many problems dealing with the bankruptcy bill that
Congress did not even want to touch the issue. It is a real
interesting sidelight and gives you a window into how some of
the things work in Congress.
How is property and casualty insurance defined in the Act? It
is generally commercial property, casualty, excess insurance,
workers compensation, and surety.39  It excludes medical
malpractice, federal flood insurance, crop insurance, and mono-
line financial guaranty insurance. 40
What is "an insurer" under the Act? Generally, it is an insurer
licensed in any state, admitted in any state, or alien surplus lines
carriers, and the insurer must receive direct earned premiums
for the types of property and casualty coverage under the Act.4 1
In short, you have to meet the licensing or admitted
requirements 42 and you also have to collect premiums for the
losses that are covered under the bill.43 An insured loss under the
36 See Michael J. Whidden, Unequal Justice: Arabs in America and Unites States
Anti-Terrorism Legislation, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2825, 2858 (2001) (referring to violence
by abortion protestors as "anti-abortion terrorism"); John Kifner, Finding a Common Foe,
Fringe Groups Join Forces, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1998, at 3 (commenting on anti-abortion
fringe groups teaming up with right-wing militias).
37 See Kifner, supra note 36, at 3 (indicating that violence acts by anti-abortion fringe
groups were terrorism).
38 See Patricia Mell, Big Brother at the Door: Balancing National Security with
Privacy Under the USA PATRIOT Act, 80 DENV. U. L. REV. 375, 410 (2002) (positing that
if domestic terrorist acts were covered under proposed terrorism bills, government could
overreach and include strikes or protests over abortion rights, animal rights, civil rights
and the environment as acts of terrorism).
39 See Terrorism Risk Insurance Act § 102(12)(A) (listing areas covered under
property and casualty insurance).
40 See id. § 102(12)(B) (excluding specific types of insurance from coverage).
41 See id. § 102(6) (defining "insurer").
42 See id. § 102(6)(A)(i) (mandating that insurers are entities 'licensed or admitted to
engage in the business of providing primary or excess insurance in any State").
43 See id. § 102(6)(B) (stipulating that insurers are entities that collect premiums for
commercial property and casualty insurance).
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bill is basically any loss that meets the definition of property and
casualty insurance. 44
Another key part of TRIA is the insurer deductible. 45 This is
the amount of money the insurer has to pay before federal aid
kicks in.46 This was set at one percent in the Transition period,
which has now passed, seven percent in 2003, ten percent in
2004, and fifteen percent in 2005. 47 The deductible is that
percentage multiplied by the amount of direct earned premium
collected by the insurer.48 Essentially, it covers all the writings
that you have by yourself and your affiliates for covered losses
under the Act.49 I think that number for AIG in 2003 is roughly
one billion dollars. 50 To give you an idea of how this legislation
works, if the World Trade Center had occurred with this bill in
place, I don't believe AIG would have received one dime from the
federal government.
Let me now move to the Program's mechanics. There are some
basic mandatory requirements. All insurers must participate
and offer coverage for acts of terrorism at materially similar term
amounts and other coverage limitations for losses that arise
apart from acts of terrorism. 51 This mandatory requirement
exists in 2003 and in 2004 and the Secretary of Treasury has an
option to make it mandatory in 2005 depending upon how the
program moves forward. 52 What is the federal share of losses?
The federal share is ninety percent of the losses above an
insurer's deductible (that amount of an insurer's direct earned
44 See id. § 102(5) (stipulating that insured losses are "any loss[es] resulting from an
act of terrorism that [are] covered by primary or excess property and casualty insurance").
45 See id. § 102(7)(A)-(E) (defining term "insurer deductible").
46 See id. (establishing methodology used for measuring direct earned premiums of
insurers).
47 See id. (outlining calculation of insurer deductibles throughout program years of
Act).
48 See id. (noting insurer's deductible is calculated by multiplying value of insurer's
direct earned premiums over the immediately preceding calendar year by a variable
percentage rate).
49 See id. § 102(6) (defining "insurer" as any entity or affiliate meeting TRIA's
established criteria).
50 See Richard G. Clemens, Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, BOWNE INSURANCE
AND FINANCIAL SERVICES REPORT, at 6 (2003) (reporting that actuarial firm Tillinghast-
Towers Perrin estimated retention of AIG in 2003 would be about $893 million dollars).
51 See Terrorism Risk Insurance Act § 103(c)(1)(A)-(B) (establishing mandatory
availability of property and casualty insurance by insurers for all losses notwithstanding
if they arise from acts of terrorism).
52 See id. § 103(c)(1)-(2) (noting Secretary of State will determine whether mandatory
requirement will be extended through Program Year 3).
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premium multiplied by the applicable times the percentage
rate). 53
The Act also contains liability caps. 54 Federal assistance is
capped at one hundred billion dollars of insured losses
annually. 55 These are not federal payments, but actual losses. 56
Liability for the insurers is eliminated above this amount, but
only conditionally because Congress then has the opportunity to
decide how it might pay for losses above this amount, and there
are no real ideas as to how Congress will do that.57 They could
say, AIG, you pay fifty percent, or AIG, you pay nothing. That
will be something to be worked out. Hopefully it will never have
to be worked out. That is a test I think all of us never want to
see.
There are also conditions to qualify for federal assistance. 58
Primarily, insurance companies have to provide clear and
conspicuous disclosure of the availability of terrorism insurance
and premium to their policyholders. 59 This was extraordinarily
complicated because the Act became effective immediately and in
the first ninety days there were all sorts of requirements related
to this condition. 60 We are past that now but a lot of
administrative expense and difficulty went into meeting this
provision. This is a very difficult provision. Essentially
insurance companies have to tell the insured how much they are
paying for the coverage. 61 The only other real mechanic in the
federal bill is that it does not allow duplicative federal
53 See id. § 103(e)(1)(A) (announcing federal share will be ninety percent above losses
incurred and will be paid once insurers meet deductible required under Act).
54 See id. § 103(e)(2) (discussing caps on federal assistance).
55 See id. § 103(e)(2)(A)(i) (announcing Congressional cap on annual liability of
aggregate insurance losses as one hundred billion dollars).
56 See id. § 103(e)(2) (indicating Secretary of State shall notify Congress if estimated
or actual aggregate insured losses exceed one hundred billion dollars).
57 See id. § 103(3)-(4)declaring that if insured losses exceed one hundred billion
dollars, Congress will determine appropriate procedures for and sources of payments for
such excess insured losses).
58 See id. § 103(b)(1)-(4) (outlining requirements for receiving federal payments).
59 See id. § 103(b)(2) (stating that "insurer provides clear and conspicuous disclosure
to the policyholder of the premium charged for insured losses covered by the program").
60 See Patrick Bonner, Admiralty Law in the Wake of Terrorism: Insurance and
Liability Relating to an Oil Spill Caused by Terrorism, 77 TUL. L. REV. 1157, 1178 (2003)
(enumerating actions required within ninety days of TRIA's enactment).
61 See Lucien J. Dhooge, The Terrorism Insurance Market After Sept. 11: The Case for
Limited Federal Intervention, 34 MCGEORGE L. REV. 27, 51 (2002) (maintaining that
insurers must provide notice to policyholders in order to be eligible for reimbursement of
certified terrorism losses under TRIA).
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compensation. 62 Thus, if insurance companies or policyholders
received federal aid under another federal program then they
may not receive anything more under this program.63
Reinsurance is not covered under the Act directly.64 In other
words, the federal government will not provide a backstop to
reinsurance companies, but an insurer can reinsure its
deductible. 65
There are also interesting parts of the mandatory and
discretionary-recoupment of federal aid.66 There is a mandatory
industry payment before the taxpayer is on the hook.67 That is, if
there is a terrorist event, the industry must assume a certain
amount of the loss before open-ended federal aid is available.
68
The Act does that by having mandatory recoupment provisions
and then beyond that, discretionary recoupment provisions. 69 As
an example, assume MG's deductible is one billion dollars and
we suffered a loss of two billion dollars. Our deductible is one
billion dollars plus ten percent of the remainder. That would be
$1.1 billion dollars. Nine hundred million dollars of federal
assistance would be provided to our policyholders to pay for those
losses. Yet, because it is below the ten billion dollar mandatory
recoupment amount, all commercial policyholders in the United
States would be assessed a surcharge to pay back that nine
hundred million dollars.70 AIG itself on its policies qualifies for
62 See Terrorism Risk Insurance Act § 103(e)(1)(B) (announcing that federal
compensation under TRIA will be reduced by amount of federal compensation for insured
losses under any other federal insurance or reinsurance program).
63 See generally Anne Gron & Alan 0. Sykes, Terrorism and Insurance Markets: A
Role for the Government as Insurer?, 36 IND. L. REV. 447, 447 (2003) (stating that
terrorism loss coverage after Sept. 11th attacks has been "difficult or impossible to
obtain").
64 See Terrorism Risk Insurance Act § 103(g) (discussing how insurers are not
prevented from obtaining reinsurance coverage for insurer deductibles or insured losses).
65 See id. § 103(g)(2) (noting participating insurance companies' deductibles
throughout TRIA's enforcement).
66 See id. § 103(e)(7)(A)-(D) (detailing recoupment of federal amounts).
67 See Dhooge, supra note 61, at 51 (explaining there are mandatory recoupment of
payments by insurance companies before public has to pay).
68 See Terrorism Risk Insurance Act § 103(e)(1)(A) (stating that governmental share
of compensation for insured losses during the one-year period after TRIA's enactment and
every year of the program shall be equal to ninety percent of insured losses which exceed
insurance company deductibles required to be paid).
69 See Dhooge, supra note 61, at 53 (discussing how discretionary recoupment under
TRIA is assessed to the extent federal assistance exceeds any mandatory recoupment
amount).
70 See Terrorism Risk Insurance Act § 103(e)(6)(A)-(C) (outlining insurance
marketplace aggregate retention amounts for specific years under said TRIA).
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the federal assistance, but because the industry as a whole has
not met that minimum amount, all policyholders must repay the
assistance that is provided to AIG policyholders. Those numbers
would also go up in the subsequent years of the Act.71 Had we
suffered a loss of twelve billion dollars then there would not be a
mandatory recoupment, but with lots of factors at his discretion,
the Secretary of the Treasury can in fact assess surcharges on all
companies to recoup the entire amount, all the way up to roughly
eighty billion dollars.72 Theoretically, this could be imposed upon
all policyholders at a later date.
A captive insurer is basically a company forming its own
insurance entity and obtaining a license to self-insure itself.73
Originally it was thought that captives were not covered by the
Act because there were provisions for the Secretary to bring them
in later.74 However, recently issued Treasury regulations and
guidance make it clear that if you are a captive insurance
company and you are licensed, then you are covered under the
Act. 75
Personal lines products such as your auto insurance, your
homeowners insurance, and life insurance are not covered under
the Act. 76 The Treasury however did make provisions to study
the extent of whether this should be covered in the future.77 I
think that in a large part because we did not have the crisis in
reinsurance for life insurance policies that we did in property
and casualty insurances; therefore there was not a compelling
need to cover life insurance immediately. 78 Incidentally, the
Treasury is doing a study on this issue right now.79
71 See id. § 103(e)(6)(A)-(C) (announcing applicable rate increases each year of TRIA' s
existence).
72 See id. § 103(e)(7) (articulating recoupment policy).
73 See William B. Barker, Federal Income Taxation and Captive Insurance, 6 VA. TAX
REV. 267, 267-69 (1986) (defining captive insurers as insuring risks via insurance
companies they control).
74 See Terrorism Risk Insurance Act § 103(t) (announcing provision to bring in captive
insurers if necessary).
75 31 C.F.R. § 50.5()(1)(i)(A) (2003) (promulgating that licensed captive insurance
companies are covered under TRIA), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/domestic-
finance/financial-institution/terrorism-insurance/regulations/final-rule772003.pdf. (last
visited Oct. 21, 2003).
76 See Terrorism Risk Insurance Act § 102(12) (listing types of insurance covered).
77 See id. § 103(h) (mandating that Secretary of Treasury conduct studies to
investigate possible expansion of reinsurance plan to personal insurance).
78 See generally Dhooge, supra note 61, at 32-33 (discussing life insurance losses due
to September 11th were less than losses for commercial casualty, property and liability
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After September 1 1 th, but prior to enactment of TRIA, insurers
started utilizing exclusions for terrorism coverage.80 The Act
generally pre-empted those exclusions, and allowed for the
reinstatement of coverage. 81 It provided an exclusive definition
for acts of terrorism so New York State, for example, cannot
make up its own definition and decide what coverage is going to
be. 82 TRIA retained the general state authority--the existing
state regulatory regime for insurance, although we would believe
this is inconsistent with the federal guidelines and the national
objectives. 83 Generally speaking, state approval of rates and
forms is preserved, but the states are not allowed to require prior
approval of those rates and forms in 2003.84
On the litigation front, the Act creates an exclusive federal
cause of action for property damage, personal injury or death. 85
Punitive damages were allowed pursuant to state law but are not
to be covered under the TRIA as insured losses,8 6 although there
are some issues as to how those might relate to deductibles going
forward. 87
All state actions for these types of claims - that is property
damage, personal injury or death - otherwise available under
state law were preempted.8 8 That created some interesting
questions that we really have not seen much of. But going
insurance).
79 See Terrorism Risk Insurance Act, § 103(i)(1) (requiring Secretary of Treasury to
study effects of terrorism to assess future availability to life insurance under TRIA).
80 See Jeff Woodward, The ISO Terrorism Exclusions: Background and Analysis,
IRMI INSIGHTS, Feb. 2002 (arguing that exclusions for terrorism coverage existed before
TRIA), available at http://www.irmi.com/insights/articles/woodward006.asp.
81 See Dhooge, supra note 61, at 50-53 (discussing how TRIA pre-empted terrorism
exclusions and allowed for reinstatement of policies).
82 See Terrorism Risk Insurance Act § 106(a)(2)(A) (providing that 'terrorism,' as
defined by TRIA, supercedes state law definitions of this term).
83 See id. § 106(a) (explaining areas where state power is preserved).
84 See id. § 106(2)(B) (announcing that states are not allowed to require prior
approval of insurance rates and forms in 2003).
85 See id. § 107(a)(2)-(3) (articulating preemption of state causes of action); see also
Dhooge, supra note 61, at 44 (stating that TRIA granted parties injured through
terrorism exclusive federal cause of actions to litigate).
86 See id. § 107(a)(5) (announcing that punitive damages would not count as losses
under TRIA).
87 See, e.g., Simon Cooper & Carmel Walsh, The US Terrorism Risk Insurance Act
2002 (TRL4), ALL REGIONS, June 27, 2003 (listing potential problems with TRIA include
calculation of deductibles).
88 See Terrorism Insurance Conference Report- Key Features, INS. CHRONICLE, Oct. 29,
2002 at 7 (recognizing that property loss, personal injury, and death, arising from
terrorist events, are governed by state law).
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forward, what does this mean even for the adjudication process
for workers compensation? There may be some novel theories.
Again, we hope none of this ever gets tested, but in the event
something arises, there may be some novel legal theories that
could arise under the Act.
For the next steps, Treasury regulations will be issued.8 9 They
issued their first set of regulations recently. Finally, we still wait
for state actions on this law. 90
89 See, e.g. Treasury Department Announces Interim Guidance on Terrorism
Insurance for Insurance Industry Treasury and State Insurance Commissioners Work
Closely Together, FDCH FED. DEP'T. & AGENCY Docs. REGULATORY INTELLIGENCE DATA,
Dec. 3, 2002 (discussing Treasury interim guidance for insurers with drafted regulations).
90 See Industry Likes How Treasury's Terrorism Backstop Regulations Are Unfolding,
BESTWIRE, Apr. 18, 2003 (noting Treasury regulations were issued following TRIA's
passage and that the Treasury was continuing work on new regulations).

